Incident with several GitHub Services
GitHub · Letzter gespeicherter Anbieterstatus: resolved
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Gespeicherte Ereignisdetails
- Anbieterstatus
- resolved
- Anbieterauswirkungen
- critical
- Anbieterdatensatz erstellt
- 13 Sep 2026, 09:16:11 UTC
- Anbieterdatensatz aktualisiert
- 15 Sep 2026, 21:47:16 UTC
- Ausdrücklicher Anbieterbeginn
- 13 Sep 2026, 09:16:11 UTC
- Ausdrückliches Anbieterende
- 13 Sep 2026, 10:44:55 UTC
Vom Anbieter gemeldete betroffene Komponenten
- Actions
br0l2tvcx85d - API Requests
brv1bkgrwx7q - Pull Requests
hhtssxt0f5v2 - Issues
kr09ddfgbfsf - Pages
vg70hn9s2tyj
Zuordnungen beschreiben gemeldeten Ereignisumfang, keine aktuelle Komponentenverfügbarkeit oder verifizierten Abhängigkeiten.
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Anbieterupdates in gespeicherten Revisionen
Neueste zuerst. Bis zu 100 verschiedene Updates aus den letzten 20 gespeicherten Revisionen. Geänderte Formulierungen bei gleicher Anbieterzeit bleiben separat.
- resolved
On September 13, 2026, between 08:43 and 10:44 UTC, GitHub experienced degraded availability across approximately 28 services, including Issues, Pull Requests, Actions, Codespaces, Pages, Notifications, Code Scanning, Git LFS, and new account signup. At peak, 8.8% of requests to create GitHub App installation access tokens failed. Token issuance for Actions workflows was also affected, impacting approximately 4% of workflows during the incident time frame. Creating issues through the web interface failed for about 96% of attempts, and signup failures were above 90%. <br /> <br />The cause was an internal data-cleanup job that began writing to a shared database cluster at 07:33 UTC. That cluster stores permission data read on nearly every authenticated request. The safeguard that was pacing the background job watched only one health signal — how far the database replicas were lagging — and that signal stayed low the whole time. It did not account for the load building on the primary itself, so the job kept writing while the primary quietly ran toward its limit. <br /><br />When the primary ran out of available connections, requests that needed it could not complete. First, there was no quick timeout on these database calls, so request handlers waited on the stalled database instead of failing fast, and the shared request-handling capacity degraded into site-wide errors. Second, a retry loop around token creation kept re-sending the writes that were already failing, which held the database saturated rather than letting it recover. <br /><br />Monitoring declared the incident at 08:50 UTC, but due to the broad impact and amplification from token creation, it took time to identify the source of the load. First responders mitigated by shedding internal load and pausing the job, and all services recovered by 10:44 UTC. <br /><br />To prevent recurrence, we are rate-limiting background jobs against shared, customer-serving databases by default, and adding automatic pausing and paging on primary-server load rather than replication lag alone. We are also surfacing running background work directly alongside database health signals so responders can see and pause it without leaving those dashboards, bounding retries in the token-issuing path, and adding request-level timeouts so one unhealthy database cannot consume shared web server capacity. In addition, we are breaking apart this database cluster to remove the single point of failure. We will be moving various service-specific data, including the authorization data, out of this shared cluster in the next two weeks.
In gespeicherter Revision gesehen um 06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
In gespeicherter Revision gesehen um 06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
We have reduced load on this cluster with internal load-shedding and are seeing signs of recovery but continue to monitor
In gespeicherter Revision gesehen um 06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
We're seeing increased database replication delays on collab which is causing increased error rates in authorization endpoints and follow-on increased error rates across the system - we are investigating
In gespeicherter Revision gesehen um 06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
In gespeicherter Revision gesehen um 06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
We are investigating reports of degraded availability for API Requests, Issues, Pages and Pull Requests
In gespeicherter Revision gesehen um 06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC