Incident with Actions
GitHub・最後の保存提供元状態：resolved
公式情報源の文章は原語で表示します。
最後の保存インシデント状態は現在サービス状態ではありません。一覧は不完全の場合があり、情報源からの消失は復旧確認ではありません。最新証拠は現在報告・公式情報源を開いてください。
保存インシデント詳細
- 提供元状態
- resolved
- 提供元が報告する影響
- critical
- 提供元記録の作成
- 26 Aug 2026, 15:11:58 UTC
- 提供元記録の更新
- 27 Aug 2026, 02:24:56 UTC
- 提供元が明記した開始
- 26 Aug 2026, 15:11:58 UTC
- 提供元が明記した終了
- 26 Aug 2026, 18:01:30 UTC
提供元が報告した影響を受けるコンポーネント
- Actions
br0l2tvcx85d - Pages
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関連はインシデント報告範囲で、現在コンポーネント可用性や検証依存関係を証明しません。
記録の作成時刻が障害開始時刻とは限りません。未報告の時刻は不明のままです。収集時刻から停止時間を算出しません。
保存リビジョンの提供元更新
新しい順です。最新の保存内容20リビジョンから最大100件の異なる更新を表示します。同じ提供元時刻の文章変更も別に保持します。
- resolved
On August 26, 2026 from 15:02 to 15:45 UTC, Actions jobs failed to start. The following 2 hours until 17:40 UTC, Actions runs were delayed starting by more than 5 minutes as the system caught up with delayed load. This impact was triggered by saturation of writes to the database primary used by the service processing triggers for Actions workflows. The primary was failed over, but the system did not fully recover. The saturation was caused by growing daily peak load combined with an upstream issue in GitHub’s event processing infrastructure, https://www.githubstatus.com/incidents/hcbtzksccj2f, which caused burst amplification of already-high load. Downstream throttles that were later used to recover were set ~10% too high to protect the system. <br /><br />At 15:45 UTC, throttling combined with service restarts recovered the service’s core health. Those throttles were gradually raised between 15:54 and 17:22 to restore full webhook processing for Actions runs. This ramp was deliberately slow to ensure we did not re-overwhelm the system given our original throttling was now known to be incorrectly set. The queue of webhook events was fully burned down at 17:40 UTC. <br /><br />3.7% of larger-runner jobs, along with some scale-set self-hosted jobs, remained stuck in queued or “waiting for runner” state. We deployed a change to force-revoke jobs in this state, and they transitioned to failed at 18:40 UTC, about 50 minutes after incident mitigation. Releasing these jobs also freed hosted concurrency for larger-runner jobs. <br /><br />Customers using concurrency groups saw longer impact due to a separate issue where runners assigned to a subset of jobs disconnected before the force-revoke mitigation was deployed, which prevented runner acquisition from progressing and left jobs in a waiting-for-runner state. This was resolved at 01:00 UTC on August 27. <br /><br />Some runs triggered during the 15:02-15:45 UTC incident window encountered a bug that left them showing as queued even after service recovery. In the backend, these runs had already failed and will automatically move to canceled state 24 hours after creation. As follow-up, we are fixing the root cause of this queued state and improving our ability to bulk-cancel affected runs. <br /><br />Several changes to improve the general scalability of this part of Actions were already complete and deploying to production. Rollout of those changes will be complete within the next 24 hours. Further work to improve scale, resiliency, and more graceful degradation of Actions workflows are in flight. We are also taking a repair item to accelerate clearing of stuck queued or waiting jobs in similar future cases.
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - monitoring
All inbound queues have recovered and Actions is operating as expected. 3.7% of jobs assigned to larger runners during the early stage of this incident are stuck waiting for runner assignment. Those will be canceled within the hour. Other runners are successfully processing all new jobs.
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - monitoring
The degradation affecting Actions has been mitigated. We are monitoring to ensure stability.
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
We are continuing to observe recovery and expect actions inbound queues to be back to normal in <30min. Work will continue to flow through the system subject to per-customer concurrency limits.
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
We are continuing to observe recovery and delayed queues are burning down. Some customers will continue to see increased delays until all throttled work has been completed - we expect this within the next hour.
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
Pages is operating normally.
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
We believe we've identified and addressed the issue and are ramping traffic back up slowly to ensure it doesn't recur. Some customers will continue to see delays as we ramp up.
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
primary failover briefly improved performance but did not fully mitigate, we've throttled inbound traffic and are investigating upstream Vitess issues
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
We've identified an issue with a database primary and are failing over to a replica immediately
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
Pages is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
We are investigating reports of degraded availability for Actions
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC