Incident with several GitHub Services
GitHub・最後の保存提供元状態：resolved
公式情報源の文章は原語で表示します。
最後の保存インシデント状態は現在サービス状態ではありません。一覧は不完全の場合があり、情報源からの消失は復旧確認ではありません。最新証拠は現在報告・公式情報源を開いてください。
保存インシデント詳細
- 提供元状態
- resolved
- 提供元が報告する影響
- critical
- 提供元記録の作成
- 13 Sep 2026, 09:16:11 UTC
- 提供元記録の更新
- 15 Sep 2026, 21:47:16 UTC
- 提供元が明記した開始
- 13 Sep 2026, 09:16:11 UTC
- 提供元が明記した終了
- 13 Sep 2026, 10:44:55 UTC
提供元が報告した影響を受けるコンポーネント
- Actions
br0l2tvcx85d - API Requests
brv1bkgrwx7q - Pull Requests
hhtssxt0f5v2 - Issues
kr09ddfgbfsf - Pages
vg70hn9s2tyj
関連はインシデント報告範囲で、現在コンポーネント可用性や検証依存関係を証明しません。
記録の作成時刻が障害開始時刻とは限りません。未報告の時刻は不明のままです。収集時刻から停止時間を算出しません。
保存リビジョンの提供元更新
新しい順です。最新の保存内容20リビジョンから最大100件の異なる更新を表示します。同じ提供元時刻の文章変更も別に保持します。
- resolved
On September 13, 2026, between 08:43 and 10:44 UTC, GitHub experienced degraded availability across approximately 28 services, including Issues, Pull Requests, Actions, Codespaces, Pages, Notifications, Code Scanning, Git LFS, and new account signup. At peak, 8.8% of requests to create GitHub App installation access tokens failed. Token issuance for Actions workflows was also affected, impacting approximately 4% of workflows during the incident time frame. Creating issues through the web interface failed for about 96% of attempts, and signup failures were above 90%. <br /> <br />The cause was an internal data-cleanup job that began writing to a shared database cluster at 07:33 UTC. That cluster stores permission data read on nearly every authenticated request. The safeguard that was pacing the background job watched only one health signal — how far the database replicas were lagging — and that signal stayed low the whole time. It did not account for the load building on the primary itself, so the job kept writing while the primary quietly ran toward its limit. <br /><br />When the primary ran out of available connections, requests that needed it could not complete. First, there was no quick timeout on these database calls, so request handlers waited on the stalled database instead of failing fast, and the shared request-handling capacity degraded into site-wide errors. Second, a retry loop around token creation kept re-sending the writes that were already failing, which held the database saturated rather than letting it recover. <br /><br />Monitoring declared the incident at 08:50 UTC, but due to the broad impact and amplification from token creation, it took time to identify the source of the load. First responders mitigated by shedding internal load and pausing the job, and all services recovered by 10:44 UTC. <br /><br />To prevent recurrence, we are rate-limiting background jobs against shared, customer-serving databases by default, and adding automatic pausing and paging on primary-server load rather than replication lag alone. We are also surfacing running background work directly alongside database health signals so responders can see and pause it without leaving those dashboards, bounding retries in the token-issuing path, and adding request-level timeouts so one unhealthy database cannot consume shared web server capacity. In addition, we are breaking apart this database cluster to remove the single point of failure. We will be moving various service-specific data, including the authorization data, out of this shared cluster in the next two weeks.
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
Pull Requests is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
We have reduced load on this cluster with internal load-shedding and are seeing signs of recovery but continue to monitor
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
We're seeing increased database replication delays on collab which is causing increased error rates in authorization endpoints and follow-on increased error rates across the system - we are investigating
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
Actions is experiencing degraded performance. We are continuing to investigate.
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC - investigating
We are investigating reports of degraded availability for API Requests, Issues, Pages and Pull Requests
保存リビジョンでの確認：06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC