ARCHIVED OFFICIAL INCIDENT

Degraded Git Operations over SSH

GitHub · Last saved provider status: resolved

Current service report →
This is historical evidence.

The last saved event status is not the current service status. Source lists can be incomplete, and disappearance from a source does not confirm recovery. Open the current report or the official source for newer evidence.

Saved event details

Provider status
resolved
Provider impact
none
Provider record created
21 Aug 2026, 14:00:00 UTC
Provider record updated
24 Aug 2026, 07:19:23 UTC
Explicit provider start
24 Aug 2026, 07:19:22 UTC
Explicit provider end
21 Aug 2026, 14:00:00 UTC

The provider's end time precedes its start time. These reported timestamps do not establish a valid event duration.

Affected components reported by the provider

The provider explicitly listed no affected components in this saved revision.

These associations describe this event’s reported scope. They do not establish current component availability or verified dependencies.

A record creation time is not necessarily an outage start. Unreported times remain unavailable. We do not calculate downtime from collection times.

Provider updates in saved revisions

Latest first. We show up to 100 distinct updates from the latest 20 saved content revisions. Revised wording at the same provider time is retained separately.

  1. resolved

    On August 21, 2026, between 14:00 and 14:07 UTC, dotcom Git operations over SSH were degraded. Successful Git operations over SSH fell by more than 95% for during the peak impact window, making clone, fetch, or push over SSH effectively unavailable to most users for approximately four minutes. Git operations over HTTPS were not affected. The incident was caused by a software defect in our load-balancing infrastructure that was triggered by a configuration change. The defect only occurred when connections passed through multiple layers of load balancers running the new configuration, which meant it was not detected during canary testing. We mitigated the incident by rolling back the configuration change. We are adding regression coverage for multi-layer load-balancer configurations and improving monitoring and alerting for Git operations over SSH to reduce our time to detection and mitigation of similar issues in the future.

    Seen in a saved revision at 06 Oct 2026, 13:58:39 UTC